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Abstract
Whilst significant research effort into adversarial examples
(AE) has emerged in recent years, the main vector to realize
these attacks in the real-world currently relies on static adver-
sarial patches, which are limited in their conspicuousness and
can not be modified once deployed.
In this paper, we propose Short-Lived Adversarial Pertur-
bations (SLAP), a novel technique that allows adversaries to
realize robust, dynamic real-world AE from a distance. As
we show in this paper, such attacks can be achieved using
a light projector to shine a specifically crafted adversarial
image in order to perturb real-world objects and transform
them into AE. This allows the adversary greater control over
the attack compared to adversarial patches: (i) projections
can be dynamically turned on and off or modified at will, (ii)
projections do not suffer from the locality constraint imposed
by patches, making them harder to detect.
We study the feasibility of SLAP in the self-driving sce-
nario, targeting both object detector and traffic sign recogni-
tion tasks. We demonstrate that the proposed method gener-
ates AE that are robust to different environmental conditions
for several networks and lighting conditions: we successfully
cause misclassifications of state-of-the-art networks such as
Yolov3 and Mask-RCNN with us to 98% success rate for a
variety of angles and distances. Additionally, we demonstrate
that AE generated with SLAP can bypass SentiNet, a recent
AE detection method which relies on the fact that adversarial
patches generate highly salient and localized areas in the input
images.
1 Introduction
Recent advances in computational capabilities and machine
learning algorithms have lead to deep neural networks (DNN)
rapidly becoming the dominant choice for a wide range of
computer vision tasks. Due to their performance, DNNs are
increasingly being used in security-critical contexts, such as
biometric authentication or object recognition for autonomous
(a) Non adversarial scenario. (b) Adversarial projection.
Figure 1: The attack visualized. A projector shines a specific
pattern on the stop sign causing an object detector (Yolov3 in
this picture) to misdetect the object.
driving. However, if a malicious actor controls the input of the
network, it is a well known issue that DNNs are susceptible
to carefully crafted adversarial examples (AE) [36], which
leverage specific directions in input space to create examples
which may resemble legitimate images, but cause misclassifi-
cation at test time.
Significant body of earlier research focused on analyz-
ing AE in the digital domain, where it is assumed that
the adversary has the capability of making pixel-specific
manipulations in the input. This concept has further been
brought into practice with the realization of physically robust
AE [10, 13, 14, 34, 38], which are examples that survive a
set of real-world environmental conditions, such as different
viewing distances or angles. In order to realize the AE, these
works either print patches (e.g. as stickers or in the form of
glasses in case of face recognition), or replace an entire object
by printing it with subtle differences (e.g., replace a stop sign
with an adversarial poster of a stop sign). However, the use of
patches to realize AE has multiple limitations. Firstly, such
patches usually generate highly salient areas in the network
inputs, which makes them detectable by recent countermea-
sures [11]. Secondly, in the autonomous driving scenario,
sticking patches on a traffic sign leads to continuous misde-
tection of such signs, which is equivalent to removing the
sign from the road or covering it. Lastly, once placed, these
patches can not be modified and are easily spotted by every
passerby.
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In this paper, we focus on the autonomous driving scenario
and propose using a light projector to achieve Short-Lived
Adversarial Perturbations (SLAPs), a novel AE approach that
allows adversaries to realize robust, dynamic real-world AE
from a distance. This class of AE techniques provides the at-
tacker with multiple benefits over existing patch-based meth-
ods and evade detection by existing countermeasures. Firstly,
an adversary is free to control when to turn on and off a certain
projection or can even modify the projected image, allowing a
specific perturbation to be arbitrarily short-lived. This means
that adversaries can (i) target specific vehicles by using the
projector when the target vehicle is approaching a sign and
(ii) able to leave no traces of a malicious attack. Secondly,
a projection is more dynamic compared to a patch, meaning
that instead of crafting a patch that works in many different
conditions (e.g., different ambient light, different angles) the
adversary can dynamically change the projection based on the
current situation. Additionally, in black-box scenarios, when
adversaries do not know the detection system operating on a
car, they can use a set of pre-computed projections or make
different adjustments until they find a successful projection
that leads to misclassifications.
As part of designing the SLAP attack, we propose a method
to quickly and accurately model the effect of projections un-
der certain environmental conditions, by analyzing the ab-
solute changes in pixel colors captured by an RGB camera
as different projections are being shown. The method con-
sists of fitting a differentiable model that allows us to prop-
agate the derivatives of the projection through such model
during the AE crafting phase. We also improve the robustness
of AE in the physical world by systematically identifying
and accounting for a larger set of environmental changes,
which were limited to viewing angles and distance in previ-
ous works [13, 15, 38]. We empirically analyze the feasibility
of SLAP on two different use-cases: (i) object detection and
(ii) traffic sign recognition. The goal of object detection is to
recognize instances of semantic objects from an image (in-
cluding traffic signs), while traffic sign recognition consists
in distinguishing different traffic signs (given a cutout of the
sign).
We carry out our attack on four different models: Yolov3,
Mask-RCNN, Lisa-CNN, and Gtsrb-CNN, demonstrating that
depending on the ambient light conditions, the attack success-
fully makes a stop sign go undetected in over 90% of camera
frames. We also evaluate the transferability of such attack
showing that depending on the model used during the AE
crafting phase, SLAP could be used to conduct black-box
attacks. In particular we test a black-box attack against the
Google Vision API showing that Mask-RCNN and Yolov3
provide adversarial patterns that lead to stop sign being not
detected in over 95% of frames. Finally, we show how SLAP
can bypass SentiNet [11], a recent AE detection method
which leverages the high salient areas generated by adver-
sarial patches to detect malicious examples. Since SLAP does
not present a locality constraint as adversarial patches, we can
bypass detection by SentiNet, leading to AE being incorrectly
classified as benign samples in over 99% of cases.
Contributions.
• We propose SLAP, a novel attack vector for the realiz-
ability of AE in the physical world by using an RGB
projector. This technique gives a set of advantages com-
pared to printing patches and sticking them to the target
object. These include that the attack is (i) opportunisti-
cally applicable and short-lived, which extends its incon-
spicuousness and targeting capabilities and (ii) dynamic,
which leads to more flexibility to varying conditions at
the time of attack.
• We propose a method to craft robust AE designed for use
with a projector. The method models the effect of pro-
jections as perceived by a camera. We also enhance the
robustness of such AE by systematically identifying and
accounting for several varying environmental conditions
during the optimization process.
• We evaluate the SLAP attack on two different computer
vision tasks related to autonomous driving: (i) object
detection and (ii) traffic sign recognition. We empiri-
cally show that our AE can achieve robust misclassi-
fication results under a set of different environmental
conditions while also bypassing locality-based detection
measures [11].
2 Background and Related Work
We start by introducing the necessary background on LCD
projectors and object detection. We then cover the related
work in physically-realizable adversarial examples.
2.1 Projector technology
A common LCD (liquid crystal display) projector works by
sending light through a series of dichroic filters in order to
form the red, green and blue components of the projected
images. As the light passes through, individual pixels may be
opened or closed to allow the light to pass [16], creating a wide
range of colors. The total amount of light that projectors emit
(measured in lumens), as well as the amount of light per area
(measured in lux) is an important factor for determining the
image quality, with stronger output leading to more accurate
images in a range of conditions. Common office projectors
are in the range of 2,000-3,000 lumens of emitted light, while
the higher-end projectors can achieve up to tens of thousands
of lumens (e.g., the projectors used during the London 2012
Olympics).1 As lumens only measure the total quantity of
1https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/panasonic-tokyo-2020-
technology-interview/
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visible light emitted from the projector, the current ambient
light perceived on the projection surface has an important role
in determining the formed image contrast and color quality.
The brighter the ambient light, the less visible will the image
formed by a projector be due to weaker contrast and narrower
range of colors.
As an example, a 2,000 ANSI lumens projector can emit
enough light to obtain a light intensity of 2,000 lux on a square
meter area (measured for white light [35]). Such a projector
would reproduce an image in an office quite well (ambient
~500 lux), but could hardly make the image visible if it was
placed outside in a sunny day (~18,000 lux). Additionally,
projectors are generally used and tested while projecting on
a (white) projection screen, which are designed to optimize
the resulting image quality. When projecting on different
materials and non-white surfaces, the resulting image will
vary greatly given that light propagation significantly changes
depending on the material in use and the background color.
In particular, traffic signs are made of retroreflective materi-
als [30] which allows most of the light to travel back to its
source, i.e., the car headlights. In Section 4.1 we explain how
we model such changes in an empirical way that accounts for
many variability factors.
2.2 Object Detection
Object detection refers to the task of segmenting instances of
semantic objects in an image. The output of object detectors
is generally a set coordinates of bounding boxes in the input
image that contain specific objects. In the following we de-
tail two object detectors, Yolov3 [32] and Faster-RCNN [33]
which are used throughout this paper.
Yolov3 is a single-shot detector which runs inputs through
a single convolutional neural network (CNN). The CNN uses
a back-bone network to compute feature maps for each cell
in a square grid of the input image. Three grid sizes are used
in Yolov3 to increase accuracy of detecting smaller objects
(13x13, 26x26, 52x52). Yolov3 is used in many real-time
processing systems [4, 6, 37].
Faster-RCNN is the result of a series of improvements on
the initial R-CNN object detector network [17]. Faster-RCNN
uses a two-stage detection method, where an initial network
generates region proposals and a second network predicts la-
bels for proposals. More recently, Mask-RCNN [19] extended
Faster-RCNN in order to add object segmentation to object
detection. Both Yolov3 and Mask-RCNN use non-maximum
suppression in post-processing to remove redundant boxes
with high overlap.
Traffic Sign Recognition. The task of traffic sign recogni-
tion consists in distinguishing between different traffic signs.
Differently from object detection, in traffic sign recognition
the networks typically require a cutout of the sign as input,
rather than the full scene. Several datasets of videos from
car dash cameras are available online, such as LISA [31] or
Figure 2: Example of an adversarial patch attack [18]. The
network has been compromised and reacts to the sunflower
being placed in the input by misclassifying the stop sign.
SentiNet [11] leverages the locality of the patch to detect
regions with high saliency, and can therefore detect the attack.
The figure is taken from Figure 5 in [11].
GTSRB [20], in which a region of interest that identifies the
ground-truth position of the traffic sign in each video frame
is generally manually annotated. In this paper, for continuity,
we consider two different models for traffic sign recognition,
Lisa-CNN and Gtsrb-CNN, both introduced in [14], one of
the earliest works in real-world robust AE.
2.3 Physical Adversarial Examples
Kurakin et al. [23] showed that perturbations computed with
the fast gradient descent [36] method can survive printing
and re-capture with a camera. However, these perturbations
would not be realizable on a real (3D) input, therefore other
works on physical attacks against neural networks have fo-
cused on adversarial patches [8, 22]. Evtimov et al. [13, 15]
showed how to craft robust physical perturbations for stop
signs, that survive changes when reproduced in the physical
world (e.g., distance and viewing angle). The perturbation
is in the form of a poster overlaid on the stop sign itself or
a sticker patch that the authors apply to the sign. Sharif et
al. [34] showed that physical AE for face recognition can be
realized by using colored eye-glass frames, further strength-
ening the realizability of the perturbation in the presence of
input noise (e.g., different user poses, limited color gamut
of printers). Although most of these attacks are focused on
evasion attacks, localized perturbations have also been used in
poisoning attacks [18,26] both by altering the training process
or the network parameters post-training.
More recent works have focused on AE for object detec-
tion [10, 13, 38]. All these works use either printed posters or
patches to apply on top of the traffic signs as an attack vector.
As discussed in the previous section, patches suffer from sev-
eral disadvantages that can be overcome with a projector, in
particular projections are (i) short-lived and (ii) dynamic. This
allows adversaries to turn the projection on/off as they please,
which can be used to target specific vehicles and allows them
3
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Figure 3: Representation of the attack scenario. An adversary
points a projector at a stop sign and controls the projection in
order to cause the sign to be undetected by an approaching
vehicle.
to leave to traces of the malicious attack.
AE Detection. Chou et al. [11] exploited the locality of ad-
versarial patches to create an AE-detection method named
SentiNet. SentiNet aims to detect physical AE by using the
intuition that adversarial patches generate localized areas of
high saliency in input, as shown in Figure 2. These highly
salient areas successfully capture the adversarial patch in in-
put, and therefore can be used for the detection of an AE by
using the fact that such salient areas will cause misclassifica-
tions when overlaid onto other benign images. For example,
Figure 2 shows that an adversarial patch shaped as a flower
will cause the stop sign to be misclassified as a warning sign.
The same flower patch can be applied to different images and
will also cause misclassifications in other classes, which is an
unusual behavior which can be detected.
SentiNet can capture this behavior just by looking at the
saliency masks of benign images, and fitting a curve to the
accepted behavior range, rather than fitting a binary model
for the detection. This way SentiNet can adapt for unseen
attacks and therefore claims to generalize to different attack
methods. Further details can be found in the paper [11]. In
this paper we show how AE generate with SLAP can bypass
such detection.
3 Threat Model
We focus on an autonomous driving scenario, where cameras
are placed in vehicles and the vehicle makes decisions based
on the cameras’ inputs. The vehicle uses camera(s) to detect
and track the objects in the scene, including traffic signs.
Goal. The adversaries’ goal is to cause a stop sign to be
undetected by the neural networks processing the camera
feeds within the car, which will cause vehicles approaching
the stop sign to ignore them, potentially leading to accidents
and dangerous situations. The adversary may want to target
specific vehicles, therefore using patches to stick on the stop
sign is not a suitable attack vector. In fact, patches would
lead to the stop sign always being undetected by each passing
vehicle and would cause suspicion among the victim drivers
(e.g., each driver realizes that the car did not stop because of
an altered sign).
Capabilities and Knowledge. The adversary has access to
the general proximity of the target stop sign and can control a
projector so that it points to the sign, see Figure 3. We note
that the adversary does not necessarily need to have direct
physical access to the sign itself – rather to a position from
wich a visual line of sight exists. In the paper we analyze
both adversaries with white-box knowledge and a black-box
scenario based on the transferability of adversarial examples.
4 Method
In this section we explain our method to carry out the attack.
4.1 Modeling projectable perturbations
When shining light with the projector, the resulting output
color as captured by a camera depends on a multitude of fac-
tors, including: (i) projector strength, (ii) projector distance,
(iii) ambient light, (iv) camera exposure, (v) color and material
properties (diffusion, reflections) of the surface the projection
is being shone on (hereafter, projection surface). The achiev-
able color spectrum is significantly smaller than the spectrum
available to printed stickers as a result of these factors (e.g.,
a patch can be black or white, while most projections on a
stop sign will result in red-ish images). In order to understand
the feasibility of certain input perturbations, we model these
phenomena as follows.
Formalizing the problem. We wish to create a model which,
given a certain projection and a projection surface, predicts
the resulting colors in output (as captured by a camera). We
can describe this model P as follows:
P (θ1,S,P) = O, (1)
where S is the projection surface, P is the projected image, O
is the image formed by of projecting P on S and θ1 are the
model parameters, respectively.
Finding a perfect model would require taking all of the
factors listed above into account, some of which may not be
available to an adversary and is also likely to be time consum-
ing due to the volume of possible combinations. Therefore,
we opt for a sampling approach, in which we iteratively shine
a set of colors on the target surface (the traffic sign) and col-
lect the outputs captured by the camera. We then fit a model
to the collected data, which approximates the resulting output
color for given projected images and projection surfaces.
Collecting projectable colors. We define projectable colors
for a given pixel in S as the set of color which are achievable
in output for that pixel given all possible projection images.
To collect the projectable colors, we do as follows:
1. collect an image of the projection surface (S in Eq. 1).
This is an image of the actual stop sign.
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Figure 4: Camera light sensor noise visualized. The first two
images show consecutive frames, while the third image shows
the absolute pixel-wise difference (×20) between the two
frames. Such sensor noise is accounted for with smoothing
over many frames during the data collection step.
2. select a color cp = [r,g,b], shine an image of that color
Pcp over the projection surface and collect the output
Ocp .
3. repeat the previous step with different colors until
enough data is collected.
In practice, with r,g and b ∈ [0,255] we choose a certain
quantization per-color channel and project all possible col-
ors consecutively, while recording a video of the projection
surface. This allows us to collect enough information about
the full color space. With this method, we found that a quanti-
zation of 127 is enough to obtain sufficient accuracy for our
method, so that we only need to project 33 = 27 colors to
obtain enough data for our model.
Camera noise. In order to collect accurate data, our mod-
elling technique has to account for noise that is being intro-
duced by the camera. At first, we remove noise originating
from the sensitivity of the light sensor (ISO [29]), shown in
Figure 4. In fact, in non-bright lighting conditions, the camera
increases the light-sensitivity of its sensor, which generates
subtle pixel changes across consecutive (static) frames [5]. To
overcome this factor, instead of collecting individual frames
for S,Pcp ,Ocp , we collect 10 consecutive frames and com-
pute and use the median of each pixel as our final image, the
camera is static during this process.
Secondly, we found that there is a smoothing over-time
effect in the sensor readings while recording the video, so that
the sensor does not update immediately when a certain color is
being shown. Figure 6 shows how the average pixel color per
channel changes over time in relation to the timing of certain
projections being shown. The camera does not immediately
stabilize to the resulting color when a projection is shown,
but adjusts over a few frames. To account for this adaptation,
during the data collection, we interleave each projected color
with 10 frames of no projection, so that the camera re-adapts
to the image of the projection surface when nothing is being
projected.
Fitting a projection model. Once we have collected a set of
S,Pcp ,Ocp for the chosen set of colors, we construct a train-
ing dataset as follows. First we group together pixels of the
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Figure 5: Plot showing the output space of the learned projec-
tion model. Each data point correspond to a color in S and its
color is the model output P (cs,cp) for a random cp.
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Figure 6: Plot showing how the average value of a pixel per
channel (RGB) changes when a certain projection is shown.
Immediately after the projection is shown, the camera requires
a few frames (the lines are marked every 2 frames) to converge
to a stable value. The two shaded areas cover the time the
projection is being shown and are colored with the projection
color.
same color by creating a mask for each unique color in the
projection surface. In other words, we find the set of unique
colors present in S, i.e., cs ∈ Sunq and then create a mask for
each color M(cs) = {i j, ..., ik} such that:
i ∈M(cs) i.f.f. i th pixel in S == cs.
Then, for each unique source color cs, we extract all the mask-
matching pixels from the output Ocp , average their colors to
get an output color c(s,p)o , and save the following triple for
our training data {cs,cp,c(s,p)o }. Such triple indicates that by
projecting cp on pixels of color cs we obtained (on average)
the color c(s,p)o .
We then use the triples to fit a neural network composed of
two hidden layers with ReLU activation, we re-write Equa-
tion 1 as an optimization problem as follows:
LossP = argmin
θ1
∑
∀cs,cp
∥∥∥P (cs,cp)− c(s,p)o ∥∥∥
1
, (2)
where P is the model. We optimize the network using gradi-
ent descent and Adam optimizer. Using P we have a differ-
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Figure 7: Overview of the adversarial samples generation
pipeline. We optimize the projected image which passes
through the projection model in order to minimize the tar-
get detection score on a given DNN for a set of randomly
generated permutations of the input.
entiable model which can used to propagate the derivatives
through it during the AE generation 4.2.
Visualizing the Learned Model. Since the projection sur-
face S is a stop sign, pixels in S generally can be separated
into two clusters based on their color, corresponding to the
“red” and “white” part of the sign. The presence of these two
clusters is reflected in the outputs of the projection model, as
different colors will be achievable in output for the red and
white parts of the stop sign. We visualize the outputs of the
projection model in Figure 5, where we use a learned projec-
tion model P , the captured source image S and we compute a
set of output colors for random projection colors cp. Each data
point in Figure 5 corresponds to the color of an output pixel
and is marked by a different marker (either triangle or circle)
based on whether the corresponding source pixel was into the
red or white cluster. Figure 5 shows that the model learns a
different function for red or white source pixels, obtaining in
output more blue tones for white pixels while different shades
of red for the remaining red pixels.
4.2 AE Generation
In this section we describe our method for generating the
adversarial projection. As a starting point, we combine the
projection model described in Section 4.1 with the target
network and use gradient descent along both to optimize the
projected image. In its basic form, we optimize the following
loss function:
argmin
δx
J( f (t+P (x,δx))) s.t. 0≤ δx ≤ 1
where δx is the projected image, f the detection network, P
the projection model, x the input image background, x a stop
sign image, and J the detection loss, described later. In the
following we describe how we augmented the loss function
in order to facilitate the physical feasibility of the adversarial
perturbation and the convergence of the optimization.
Physical Constraints. In order to maintain the physical real-
izability of the projection, we do the following. At first, we
restrict the granularity of the projection in a fixed grid of n×n
cells, so that each cell contains pixels of the same color. This
allows us to use the same projection for different distances of
viewing the stop sign. Secondly, we include the total variation
of the projection in the loss function in order to reduce the
effect of camera smoothing and/or blurring [28].
Variable Substitution. Since the optimization problem for
the projection is bounded in [0,1] (space of RGB images)
to ease the flowing of gradients when backpropagating we
remove this box constraint. Given the image to project δx, we
substitute δx with a new variable w such that
w =
tanhδx
2
+0.5
and instead optimize for w. Since tanhδx is bounded in [−1,1]
we find that this substitution leads to faster convergence in
the optimization.
Loss Function. We also limit the amount of perturbation in
our loss so that our final optimization looks as follows:
argmin
w
J( f (t+P (x,w)))+λ‖P (x,w)− x‖p+TV(w),
where λ is a parameter used to control the importance of the
p-norm ‖·‖p and TV is the total variation described above.
Since we operate on both object detectors and traffic sign
recognizers, we use two different losses J depending on the
target network. For object detectors, we consider that the net-
work returns a finite set of boxes b ∈ B where for each box
there is an associated probability output of the box containing
a semantic object of class j, i.e., p(b)j . For traffic sign recog-
nizers, the network returns a probability vector containing the
probability of the input image being traffic sign of class j, i.e.,
p j. We then use the following loss functions in the two cases:
• Object Detectors: the loss is the sum of the detection
probabilities for stop signs, i.e., ∑b∈B p
(b)
j ;
• Traffic Sign Classification: the loss is the probability
for the stop sign class p j.
4.3 Training Data Augmentation
Generating adversarial examples that work effectively in
the physical world requires taking into account different envi-
ronmental conditions. Adversarial examples computed with
straightforward approaches such as in [36] do not survive
different viewing angles or viewing distances [13]. In order to
enhance the physical realizability of these samples, different
input transformations need to be accounted for during the
optimization. We use the Expectation over Transformation
(EOT) method [14], which consists in reducing the loss over
a set of training images computed synthetically. These train-
ing images are generated using linear transformations of the
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desired input, i.e., an image containing stop signs, so that dif-
ferent environmental conditions can be accounted for during
the optimization. Using EOT, our final loss becomes:
Loss f = argmin
w
Eti∼T,m j∼M J( f (ti+m j ·P (x,w)))
+λ‖P (x,w)− x‖p+TV(w),
(3)
where T is a distribution over several background images and
M is an alignment function that applies linear transformations
to the perturbed sign. In this work, we augment the set of
the transformations to account for additional environmental
conditions that are disregarded in previous work.
Background and Traffic Sign Post. Similarly to [38] we
select a set of road backgrounds and carefully place the stop
sign on a post at the edge of the road. In [38] it is shown
that the post provides useful information to the detector and
should therefore be included when crafting the adversarial
perturbation.
Perspective. We vary the angle at which the camera is look-
ing at the stop sign. Since we do not want to account for all
perspective transforms, we use the following observations.
Firstly, a traffic sign is mostly placed on one side of the lane
(to the right in right-driving countries), meaning that rarely
a camera mounted on a car would see a sign on the left-part
of the frame. Secondly, traffic signs are mounted at specific
heights (e.g., 5 or 7 feet in the US [3]), which normally ex-
ceed the height of cars for better visibility. Given these two
observations, we prioritize perspective transforms that match
these conditions.
Distance. As the car is approaching the stop sign, the sign
will appear with different sizes in the camera frame. Our
goal is for the car to misclassify the stop sign in every frame,
therefore we place stop signs with different sizes during the
optimization. We test the detection of the stop sign in non-
adversarial settings with decreasing stop sign sizes and we set
the minimum size of the sign to be the smallest size at which
the sign is detected with high confidence. In other words,
we only optimize for signs sizes that are large enough to be
detected by the classifier.
Rotation. As shown in [12], simple rotations may lead to mis-
classifications when those transformations are not captured
in the training dataset. We therefore add rotation to the stop
sign when crafting the adversarial perturbation.
Brightness. The color of the stop sign changes based on a
combination of ambient light and camera settings, e.g., in
sunny days the colors appear brighter to the camera. To ac-
count for this, we apply different brightness transformations
to the stop sign, so that we include a wider range of color
tones. Since different colors contribute differently to an im-
age brightness, we transform the stop sign image from RGB
to YCrCb format [1], increase the luma component (Y) by a
specified delta and then bring the image back into RGB.
Parameter Yolov3 Mask-RCNN Lisa-CNN Gtsrb-CNN
learning rate 0.005 0.005 0.05 0.05
brightness [−13,+13] (with range [0, 255])
perspective x-axis [−30◦,+30◦], y-axis [−30◦,+30◦]
rotation [−5◦,+5◦]
aspect ratio from 4:3 to 16:9
sign size [25, 90] pixels
grid size 25×25
Table 1: Parameters used for the AE generation and the train-
ing data augmentation. The values for brightness, perspective,
rotation, aspect ratio indicate the ranges for the applied trans-
formations. All parameters are picked uniformly at random
(with the exception of perspective) during the AE generation
for each sample in the generated training data.
Camera Aspect Ratio. We observe that popular object de-
tectors resize the input images to be squared before being
processed by the network (e.g., Yolov3 resizes images to
416x416 pixels), to speed up the processing. However, the
typical native aspect ratio of cameras, i.e., the size of the
sensor, is 4:3 (e.g., the Aptina AR0132 chip used in the front-
viewing cameras by Tesla, has a resolution of 1280x960 [2]).
This leads to objects in the frames to being distorted when the
frames are resized to squared. To account for this distortion,
we choose the dimension of the stop sign so that its height is
greater than its width, reflecting a 4:3 to 1:1 resizing.
4.4 Remarks
We use AdamOptimizer to run the AE generation. We opti-
mize a single variable that is the image to project with the
projector (its substitute, see Section 4.2). We use batches
of size 20. All the training images are created synthetically
by placing a stop sign on a road background and applying
the transformations described in the previous section. We do
not use a fixed pre-computed dataset, a new batch with new
images is created after every backpass on the network. The
parameters for the transformations are chosen uniformly at
random in the ranges shown in Table 1. For all operations
that require resizing, we use cubic interpolation, finding that
it provides more robust results compared to alternatives in
this use-case. We run the optimization for 50 epochs, for
each epoch we optimize the 20% worst-performing batches
by backpropagating twice, convergence is usually reached
before the last epoch. Compared to similar works [38], our
method runs significantly faster requiring only 50 modifica-
tions of the perturbation (compared to 500), which takes less
than 10 minutes on an NVIDIA Titan V GPU for Yolov3.
7
Loss f
lux
camera
exposure (ms)
LossP Y
ol
ov
3
M
as
k-
R
C
N
N
G
ts
rb
-C
N
N
L
is
a-
C
N
N
180 120 0.022 0.11 0.16 0.07 0.01
440 250 0.016 1.44 4.24 0.27 0.12
Table 2: Preliminary results for the two light settings consid-
ered in the experiment. The camera exposure is the exposure
of the camera used for profiling (set automatically by the
camera itself). The table shows the losses resulting from the
optimization: LossP refers to the loss in Equation 2, while
Loss f refers to the loss in Equation 3, for each network.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we test the feasibility of the attack in real-
world settings.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Projector Setup. To test our projection, we buy a real stop
sign of size 600x600mm. For all of our experiments, we use
a Sanyo PLC-XU4000 projector,2 which is a mid-range of-
fice projector (roughly $1,500) with 4,000 maximum lumens.
We measure the projector light intensity with a Lux Meter
Neoteck, following the 9-points measuring procedure used
to measure ANSI lumens [35], which reports that in default
settings the projector emits around 2,200 lumens. For the ex-
periments, we place the projector 2 meters away from the stop
sign, which, at maximum zoom, allows us to obtain roughly
800 lux of light on the stop sign surface. A similar amount
of projected light can be obtained from greater distances by
using long throw projectors, which are available for few thou-
sand dollars (e.g., $3,200 for Panasonic PT AE80003, see
Section 6 for a more elaborate discussion). We align the pro-
jection to match the stop sign outline by transforming the
perspective of the image.
Ambient Light. As mentioned in Section 4.1 the amount of
ambient light limits the control on the input space for the
adversary. In fact, as the ambient light increases, fewer colors
are achievables as the projector-emitted light becomes less in
the resulting appearance of the sign. To account for different
ambient light levels, even though we conduct our experiments
indoor we reproduce two separate lighting conditions: 180 lux
and 440 lux (measured on the sign). For reference, on a clear
day at sunrise/sunset the ambient light is roughly 400 lux,
while on an overcast day at the same hours there are roughly
2https://www.projectorcentral.com/Sanyo-PLC-XU4000.htm
3https://www.projectorcentral.com/Panasonic-PT-AE8000.htm
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Figure 8: Projected images used in the experiments, at mini-
mum resolution (25x25). The first and second row represent
the number of lux in which the experiment was carried out
and therefore the projection model used. Each target network
is on different columns.
40 lux [7].
Networks and Detection Thresholds. We consider four dif-
ferent networks in our experiments: two object detectors, (1)
Yolov3 and (2) Mask-RCNN, two traffic sign recognizers,
(3) Lisa-CNN and (4) Gtsrb-CNN. For Yolov3, we use the
Darknet-53 backbone of the original paper [32]. For Mask-
RCNN, we use Resnet-101 as a backbone and feature pyra-
mid network [24] for the region proposals. We download the
weights for Lisa-CNN and Gtsrb-CNN from the GitHub of
the paper authors [14].4 As Mask-RCNN and Yolov3 return a
list of boxes with a confidence score threshold for the output
class, we set the threshold for detection at 0.6 and 0.4 respec-
tively (i.e., we count detection as "there is a box labeled stop
sign with score higher than x"). These are the thresholds that
bring the highest mean Average Precision (mAP) in the coco
object detection benchmark [25]. For Lisa-CNN and Gtsrb-
CNN we set the detection threshold as 0.5. The input images
are resized to 416x416 for Yolov3 and Mask-RCNN and to
32x32 for Lisa-CNN and Gtsrb-CNN.
Metrics and Measurements. Throughout our experiments
we firstly monitor how often the stop sign goes undetected.
For object detectors (Yolov3 and Mask-RCNN), we feed each
frame into the network and we count how many times a stop
sign is detected in input. For traffic sign recognizer (Gtsrb-
CNN and Lisa-CNN), the network expects a cutout of a traffic
sign rather than the full frame. In order to obtain the cutout,
we manually label the bounding box surrounding the stop sign
and use a CSRT tracker [27] to track the stop sign over the
frames. We then count how often the predicted label is a stop
sign. In order to monitor viewing angle and distance from
the sign, we reconstruct the angle of view and distance based
on the distortion on the octagonal outline of the sign and our
recording camera field-of-view. We use the default camera
app on an iPhone X to record a set of videos of the stop sign
4https://github.com/evtimovi/robust_physical_perturbations/
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(a) Yolov3. (b) Mask-RCNN. (c) Gtsrb-CNN. (d) Lisa-CNN.
Figure 9: Baseline mis-detection rate in absence of the adversary for the 180 lux setting at different angles, distances and for
different networks, as the percentage of frames where a stop sign is not detected. Brighter shades represent higher detection
rates. Percentages for 0-3m are omitted for clarity, but the corresponding cone section is colored accordingly.
at different distances and angles, with the projection being
shone. As mentioned in Section 4.3, to match the 4:3 aspect
ratio, we crop the 1080p video from the iPhone X (which has
a resolution of 1920x1080) to 1440x1080 by removing the
sides. The videos are recorded in a large lecture theater in our
institution.
Experimental Procedure. Experiments follow this pipeline:
• Step 1: We setup the stop sign and measure the amount
of lux on the stop sign surface;
• Step 2: We carry out the profiling procedure to construct
a projection model (Section 4.1);
• Step 3: We use the projection model to run the AE gen-
eration (Section 4.2) and compute the optimal image to
project;
• Step 4: We shine the image on the sign and we take a
set of videos at different distances and angles.
Unless otherwise stated, the parameters used for the optimiza-
tion (Step 3) are those of Table 1. Recording the profiling
video of Step 2 requires less than 2 minutes, so does fitting
the projection model.
Preliminary Results. Table 2 shows parameters and resulting
value of the loss functions at the end of the optimizations for
the two light settings. The table shows that our projection
model fits the collected color triples: a loss < 0.03 shows that
the error in the predicted colors, which are in [0, 1] color space,
is less than 1% per channel. The loss for the AE generation is
also quite low for the 180 lux setting, where more colors are
achievable, and a bit higher for the 440 lux setting. It should be
noted that for object detectors this loss includes all predicted
boxes scores before the non-maximum suppression step (used
to remove redundant boxes), leading at times to scores higher
than 1. We report in Figure 8 the projected images output of
the optimization process, for each network and light setting.
Figure 8 shows that the 440 lux brighter setting leads to the
network using brighter colors in the projections, because these
colors lead to more visible changes in the output.
5.2 Detection Results
In this section we present the results of the detection in white-
box settings. Differently from related work [10, 13, 14, 38],
we also report in Figure 9 the baseline results of using the
networks to detect/classify the stop sign, by recording a video
of the stop sign unaltered. This is fundamental to understand
the effect of our projection compared to simple input noise
causing misclassifications. Figure 9 shows that all networks
work quite well in non-adversarial conditions, with the excep-
tion of Lisa-CNN which shows some misdetections for some
combinations of angles and distances.
We report in Figure 10 the results of the detection in the
180 lux setting for the different networks, as the percentage of
frames where the stop sign was not detected by the network.
The reported signs are computed with the respective projec-
tion model (one for the 180 and one for the 440 setting), so
they resemble how the stop sign looks in practice. The figures
shows that the attack is extremely successful for a variety of
angles and distances. For Yolov3 and Lisa-CNN, we obtain
more than 97% success on average between 3-12m of dis-
tance and −30◦ to 30◦ viewing angles. For Mask-RCNN and
Gtsrb-CNN there is a fading effect for angles greater than 20◦
degrees and higher distances, while high success is obtained
for closer ranges 3-6m and smaller angles. We found that at
greater distances the changes induced by the projection are
not as clear, as less of the projected light bounces from the
sign onto the recording camera, making the perturbation less
evident.
Figure 10 also shows the same figures for the 440 lux
setting. Given the higher ambient light, the amount of change
achievable on the sign is greatly reduced, leading to better
detection rates for the sign. The figure shows the same trend
for increasing distances, as now the changes induced by the
projector are not perceived well from far away. We found that
Mask-RCNN is more resilient than the other networks in the
detection, leading to success rates below 10% on average. In
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(a) Yolov3. (b) Mask-RCNN(*). (c) Gtsrb-CNN. (d) Lisa-CNN.
(e) Yolov3. (f) Mask-RCNN(*). (g) Gtsrb-CNN. (h) Lisa-CNN.
Figure 10: Attack success rate at different angles, distances and for different networks, as the percentage of frames where a
stop sign is not detected. Darker shades represent higher success rates. Percentages for 0-3m are omitted for clarity, but the
corresponding cone section is colored accordingly. The first row of figures (Figure 10a, 10b, 10c and 10d) refer to the 180 lux
setting. The second row of figures (Figure 10e, 10f, 10g and 10h) refer to the 440 lux setting. The images of the stop signs in the
figure are computed using the projection models for the two light settings, so they resemble what the adversarial stop sign looks
like in practice. (*) we set slightly different parameters for Mask-RCNN as it lead to more robust AE: the stop sign size is in
[30,104] while the grid size is 35×35, see Table 1 for reference.
particular we found that Mask-RCNN sometimes recognizes
stop signs just based on the octagonal silhouette of the sign
or even just with faded reflections of the sign on windows.
This is probably a result of the training time augmentations
used by the training process of Mask-RCNN (different scales,
horizontal flips, see [19]).
Straight Approach. We also record videos of straight ap-
proaches towards the stop sign, Figure 11 reports the result
for the 180 lux setting. The attack works well for most net-
works with detection rates below 5% for all networks except
for Mask-RCNN, which shows greater resilience at higher
distances (as the projection fades away) and at shorter ones.
5.3 Attack Transferability
In this section we test the transferability of our attack across
networks, testing all pairwise combinations of our models.
We also use the Google Vision API5 to test our projections
against their proprietary models. The API returns a list of
labeled objects in the image with associated confidence scores
5https://cloud.google.com/vision
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Figure 11: Ratio of detection of stop sign during the straight
approach towards it, for the 180 ambient light settings. The
data are grouped into 1m bins, the ratio of detection shows the
ratio of frames where a stop sign is detected by the network,
vertical bars show the standard deviation for the bin. The data
points are slightly shifted on the x-axis to avoid overlaps.
and bounding boxes, "stop sign" is one of the labels. We set
the detection threshold for Google Vision API as 0.01, i.e.,
we count that a stop sign is detected in a frame if the API
replies with a stop sign object with confidence greater than
0.01.
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Target Model
lux Source Model no. frames Yolov3 Mask-RCNN Gtsrb-CNN Lisa-CNN Google Vision*
180
Yolov3 7390 - 4.0% 14.6% 17.5% 95.8%
Mask-RCNN 6668 22.4% - 25.0% 30.5% 95.5%
Gtsrb-CNN 7058 12.3% 2.0% - 13.4% 76.4%
Lisa-CNN 5839 9.0% 0.6% 35.7% - 58.4%
440
Yolov3 6340 - 0.8% 40.3% 40.9% 71.2%
Mask-RCNN 5589 5.4% - 41.1% 35.6% 67.4%
Gtsrb-CNN 6149 0.7% 0.7% - 35.6% 72.5%
Lisa-CNN 5830 1.0% 2.4% 26.4% - 66.9%
Table 3: Transferability results. The table reports the percentage of frames where the stop sign was undetected by the target
network. We test all the frames from the collected videos with a certain projection being shone against a different target model.
Results shown for both light settings. (*) we only test one frame every 30 frames, i.e., one per second.
We report the results in Table 3. The table shows the source
(white-box) model on the left, which identifies the projection
shown in the tested videos (we also report the number of
frames tested). On the right, there are the success rates of the
attack as a percentage of the frames where the stop sign was
undetected. Table 3 shows that our attack does not transfer
well across many pairs. This is due to the limited control
over the input space that a projector allows to adversaries.
In comparison, patches allow for changes in input close to
X since the patches are overlayed on top of the stop sign.
The fact that in brighter settings (440 lux) the results worsen
is also a result of this limited control. We find that Mask-
RCNN transfers better to Yolov3 compared to the opposite
direction. AE computed on Mask-RCNN transfer better to
black-box models. We find that the our adversarial projections
are particularly effective against the Google Vision API, this
is particularly true for Yolov3 and Mask-RCNN.
5.4 Bypassing attack detection
We evaluate the AE generated by SLAP against SentiNet,
which is a system designed to detect adversarial examples
leveraging the intuition of locality of patches. In short, if an
adversarial sample contains a patch which causes a misclas-
sification, then the saliency of the area containing the patch
will be high. Therefore, the salient area will cause misclas-
sifications on other legitimate samples when overlayed onto
them (the full details of the SentiNet implementation can be
found in the paper [11].
We attempt to detect adversarial examples with SentiNet
in Gtsrb-CNN and Lisa-CNN. We select 500 random frames
from the videos targeting each of these networks (we use
videos captured in the 180 lux setting) to be tested for AE.
We use 50 test images taken from the GTSRB and the LISA
datasets within the SentiNet algorithm. The suspected ad-
versarial regions are overlaid on these test images to detect
whether they would cause misclassifications. We use 500
benign images for each network to calculate the threshold
function, which defines whether an image will be classified
as an AE or not.
To compute the salient areas in input SentiNet uses Grad-
Cam++ [9], which backpropagates the outputs to the last
convolutional layer of the network and checks which region
of the input lead to greater activations. Since the resolution of
this layer is only 4x4 for both Gtsrb-CNN and Lisa-CNN, we
instead use XRAI [21], a newer and more accurate method
to compute salient areas. Using GradCam for this task would
make the output masks unusable as a resolution of 4x4 leads
to coarse block like regions where salient areas cannot be
accurately identified (resolution also is pointed out as a prob-
lem in the original paper [11]). XRAI on the other hand pro-
duces saliency regions at the input resolution, leading to more
granular salient areas, using an algorithm that incrementally
grows salient regions. As a consequence of this improved
technique XRAI has been shown to outperform older saliency
algorithms, producing higher quality, tightly bound saliency
regions [21].
SentiNet relies on being able to compute a threshold func-
tion which separates the behavior of AE from bening images.
In the original SentiNet paper this threshold function is com-
puted using the Average Confidence, i.e., the average confi-
dence of the network prediction made on benign test images
where salient masks are replaced with inert patterns added
to them and the Fooled Percentage, i.e., the percentage of
benign test images where overlaying the salient mask leads
the network to predict the suspected adversarial class. These
two scores characterize benign behaviour and can almost per-
fectly separate benign from adversarial inputs in SentiNet. We
follow the same technique as in the original paper for fitting
the threshold function that separates the malicious and bening
data.
Results. Figure 12 shows the results of the detection. We
find that for both Lisa-CNN and Gtsrb-CNN the thresholded
curve includes all bening and malicious examples together.
We find that the true positive rate is <2% in all cases, due
11
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Average Confidence
0
20
40
60
80
100
F
oo
le
d
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Benign example
SLAP AE
(a) Gtsrb-CNN.
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Average Confidence
0
20
40
60
80
100
F
oo
le
d
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Benign example
SLAP AE
(b) Lisa-CNN.
Figure 12: SentiNet detection results for Lisa-CNN and Gtsrb-CNN. The figure shows that the benign behavior (in terms of
Average Confidence and Fooled Percentage) modeled by the fitted SentiNet line does not separate bening examples from AE,
and thus SentiNet fails to detect our attack. Results are visualized for the random noise intert pattern.
to almost zero false negatives in the detection. Similarly, the
false positive rate is 100% for all networks and inert pattern
used, because of zero true negative in the detection. The poor
performance of SentiNet for our attack occurs principally be-
cause our perturbations are spread over a large area, which
leads to the absence of a single highly salient region which
causes misclassification on other images. The original Sen-
tiNet refers to a similar potential weakness as a “size attack”,
but points out that a large enough patch is equivalent to replac-
ing the object [11]. Our results show that replacing the object
is not the only way to exploit such weakness, as we are able
to craft AE that bypass detection with our attack, while only
slightly changing the appearance of the original stop sign.
6 Discussion
In this section we discuss the attack feasibility based on our
experimental results and point out the advantages of SLAP
compared to adversarial patches.
Attack Feasibility. Our experiments demonstrate that the am-
bient light can easily limit the feasibility of the attack in bright
conditions. In practice, the attack could be carried during non-
bright days, e.g., overcast days, after sunset or before sunrise,
as the level of ambient light during these times is low (<400
lux). The amount of light that reaches the sign depends on
three factors: (i) the distance between projector and sign, (ii)
the throw ratio (or projector lens field-of-view) of the pro-
jector and (iii) the amount of lumens the projector can emit.
We report in Figure 13 a representation of how the distance
between the projector and the stop sign relates to the attack
success rate. We consider two projectors with long throw dis-
tance as example, the Panasonic PT-RZ570BU and the NEC
PH1202HL1, which are available for $3,200 and $44,379 re-
spectively. We use the projector’s throw ratios (2.93 and 3.02)
and their emitted lumens (5,000 and 12,000 lumens) to calcu-
Figure 13: Amount of lux achievable on the stop sign sur-
face for increasing projection distances and two different pro-
jectors. The horizontal line shows the threshold for success
measured in our experiments (800 lux).
late how many lux of light the projector can shine on the sign
surface from increasing distances. We consider the 180 lux
ambient light setting, as shown in our experiments, obtaining
800 lux of light on the sign with the projector is sufficient
to achieve consistent attack success in this case. Figure 13
shows that the attack could be carried out from 7.5m away
with the weaker projector and up to 13m away with the more
expensive one. Adversaries could also use different lenses to
increase the throw ratio of cheaper projectors, or stack multi-
ple projectors in order to increase the amount of lux achieved
on the sign.
Attack Flexibility. Compared to adversarial patches, the
SLAP attack offers several advantages. Firstly, the projec-
tion can be turned on and off, which leads to the ability of
carrying out opportunistic attacks which target specific vehi-
cles. Secondly, using a projector makes for a much stealthier
attack compared to patches/stickers as: (i) the stop sign does
not change its appearance until the attack starts being carried
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Network Inert Noise TPR TNR FPR FNR
Gtsrb-CNN Checkerboard 1% 0% 100% 98%
Random 2% 0% 100% 97%
Lisa-CNN Checkerboard 1% 0% 100% 98%
Random 1% 0% 100% 98%
Table 4: Results of AE detection using SentiNet. We test both
random noise and checkerboard inert patterns as suggested
in the original paper. The prediction is positive when the ex-
amples is an AE, while negative when it is a bening example.
Results show that the larger perturbation obtained with the
SLAP attack bypasses the detection.
out, (ii) the attack generates larger areas of perturbation in
the input and can therefore bypass detection countermeasures
such as SentiNet. Additionally, using SLAP is a more flexible
way to obtain robust AE which allows adversaries to improve
their adversarial perturbation much more dynamically as the
conditions change, as there is no need to print a different patch
and apply it on the sign.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we presented SLAP, a new attack vector to realize
dynamic and inconspicuous physical adversarial examples
by leveraging the use of a light projector. We investigate a
scenario in autonomous driving, where the attacker’s goal is to
change the appearance of a stop sign by shining a specifically
crafted projection onto it so that the sign is undetected by
object detectors or traffic sign recognition networks.
Given the non-trivial physical constraints of projecting spe-
cific light patterns on various materials in a range of condi-
tions, we proposed a method to generate projections that is
based on fitting a predictive color model and using an AE gen-
eration pipeline that enhances the robustness of the resulting
AEs. We evaluated the proposed attack against state-of-the-art
object detectors Yolov3 and Mask-RCNN and against traffic
sign recognition networks Lisa-CNN and Gtsrb-CNN. The
experimental results show that SLAP can generate AEs that
are robust in the real-world, for varying angles ranging from
−30◦ to 30◦ and distances in 3-12m. We additionally showed
that our AEs can perfectly bypass previously proposed detec-
tion measures that rely on the locality of adversarial patches.
The novel capability of modifying how an individual ob-
ject is detected by common DNN models, combined with the
capability of carrying out opportunistic attacks, makes SLAP
an important and powerful new attack vector that requires fur-
ther investigation. By making the full analysis and the source
code available to the wider research community, we believe
this paper makes an important first step towards increasing
the awareness and research of countermeasures against the
light-projection based adversarial attacks against DNNs.
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Source Code Availability
We make all of the code used in our experiments available
at the following GitHub repository: (blinded for review). Ad-
ditionally, we include detailed instructions for repeating the
experiments, as well as Docker containers to ease the setup
of such experiments within the repository.
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